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John Shotter has for many years been an inspirational figure for those who oppose 
conventional so-called ‘scientific’ psychology and who are looking for alternative, more 
humanistic ways of exploring psychological issues. In the earlier part of his career, John 
concentrated on exposing the failures of mainstream psychology, arguing that its models 
were intrinsically flawed, because they underestimate the essentially social nature of humans. 
In the second part, John has developed new concepts and ways of understanding how humans 
interact with each other, thereby providing new tools for psychological practitioners. 
In a previous tribute to John’s immense work, I have suggested that his perspective rests upon 
three crucial components (Billig, 2016). First there is John’s stress upon ‘joint action’. 
Contrary to the classic associationist theories, humans are not formed by the way that their 
individual minds process information, but their minds are formed within social interaction. 
This means that our actions typically are not the result of individual mental processing, but 
are joint actions taken in relation to others. Second, general laws of psychological functioning 
are bound to fail because they ignore the fact that every moment of our lives – every joint 
action that we take – is in its own way unique. 
Third, John has been concerned with the way that psychologists write their theories and 
results. Psychological approaches are not just based on theories and methodologies, but their 
rhetoric is all-important. For that reason, John has advocated that psychologists should 
develop their own ‘poetics’, in order to bring out the uniqueness and shared nature of action. 
Here John has been highly individual. He has not tried to imitate his own intellectual heroes – 
or those whom he calls his ‘textual friends’ (Shotter, 1993). He writes in a very different way 
to his greatest textual friend, Wittgenstein, who hardly ever quoted anyone else and who 
wrote as if he owed no intellectual debt to anyone else. John’s style is much more scholarly 
and he always expresses his own enthusiasm for other writers. He is generous in quoting 
others and attributing forerunners to his own ideas. In consequence, to read John’s writings is 
always to come into contact with great theorists such as Bakhtin, Merleau-Ponty, Vico and, 
of course, Wittgenstein.  
My own concern with the rhetoric of academic work matches John’s (Billig, 2013). Like John 
I have been worried that the ‘official’ style of psychological writing hides more than it 
reveals. In my view, the customary style for writing experimental reports encourages an 
unnoticed exaggeration of ‘effects’. Experimental authors learn to write as if all their 
‘subjects’ displayed a ‘significant’ effect, which is rarely if ever the case. This style enables 
authors to avoid specifying (or even calculating) just how many (or how few) of their 
‘subjects’ may have been affected by the main variable. 
John and I might share a concern with the way that mainstream psychologists write and how 
they are officially encouraged to share a common ‘scientific’ style. And I absolutely agree 
with him about the need to develop alternative poetics. But this does not mean that I have 
attempted to copy John’s unique style of writing. To do so would be to devalue his message. 
In the case of the poetics that John is advocating, imitation is not the sincerest form of 
flattery: it is the most obvious sign of misunderstanding. Just as each moment is unique, 
according to John, so each individual writer (and speaker) must develop their own unique 
voice. For me, or anyone else, to try to write like John – or for him to try to copy my style of 
writing – would be an act of bad faith. Indeed, John’s writing style is close to his spoken 
word and, for all who know him personally, this gives his writing a great sense of personal 
authenticity. 
This raises an important issue about how to be inspired by John, especially for those of us 
who are not practitioners. We should not to attempt, as it were, a mental cloning. That would 
be an unnecessary act. The world already has John. Why would it require a second John? 
Moreover, to copy John would not be to copy him, for he never copied anyone. By his 
example, he shows the necessity to oppose, rather than to imitate. His own work has been 
developed in opposition to mainstream psychology. He has delighted in the work of others 
who have opposed the orthodoxies of their own time and who have done so in their own 
individual ways. 
Moreover, John has retained his enthusiasm for intellectual work. It is rare to speak to him 
without him enthusing over some book or article that he has just read. His enthusiasms never 
fit a constant pattern. He does not derive great pleasure from having followers who might 
reproduce his ideas as if he were the Master. He delights in those who can teach him 
something new and who can tell him something about the world that has not previously 
occurred to him. Thus to be inspired by John should not mean trying to reproduce John. Over 
the years, when I have been writing something John has often been my imagined, ideal 
reader. I write in the hope that I can interest him, as I have learned so much from him. Just as 
John’s spoken and written voices inextricably converge, so does his position as both a unique 
textual and real friend. 
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